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NOTES AND COMMENTS

relief of rescission is sought on the ground of fraud, the elements of
fraud which must be proved are identical. This includes of course the
necessity of proving scienter in an action for either relief.
Although the court in the principal case chose to ignore Ebbs v. St.
Louis U-nion Trust Co., the two cases are almost identical on their
facts. 16 The Ebbs case was an action for rescission and damages on
the basis of fraud, and the principal case was an action for damages
based on fraud. It is rather evident from the two cases, that the misrepresentations were either made with knowledge of their falsity, or in
conscious ignorance as to their truth or falsity. The one making the
false representation in each case was a real estate agent, who was or
should have been experienced in the fundamentals of house construction.
Since the facts of both cases show only a lack of knowledge of truth or
falsity, with relief being granted in one and denied in the other, the
necessary conclusion follows that the two cases are in substance
inconsistent.
It would seem that the court in the Ebbs case completely overlooked
the long line of decisions in North Carolina which support the holding
of the principal case that actual knowledge of the falsity of a misrepresentation is not necessary to a finding of fraud. On the basis of the
instant case as supported by the chain of decisions, the Ebbs case (which
was never sound law) is no longer the law in North Carolina, in spite
of the failure of the court in the principal case expressly to overrule the
decision there.
EDWIN B. ROBBINS.

Wills-Caveat by Proponent
One B died, apparently intestate. His heirs at law and next of kin
recovered all of his personal papers and turned them over to the Clerk
But in Cheek v. Southern R.R., 214 N. C. 152, 156, 198 S. E. 626, 628 (1938)
the court said, "The court has not adopted the doctrine that an unilateral mistake-

or mistake alone of the party seeking to avoid the contract-unaccompanied by
fraud, imposition, undue influence, or like circumstance of oppression, is sufficient

to avoid a contract"' It was indicated in this latter case, however, that it would

be difficult to imagine a case, in which there were innocent misrepresentations on
the one side and a mistake on the other induced by such innocent misrepresentations, that could not be resolved into mutual mistake. E.g., Vail v. Vail, 233

N. C. 109, 63 S. E. 2d 202 (1951); Breece v. Standard Oil Co. of N. J., 209
N. C. 527, 184 S. E. 86 (1936); Hinsdale v. W. I. Phillips Co., 199 N. C. 563,
155 S. E. 238 (1930); Bell v. Harrison, 179 N. C. 190, 102 S. E. 200 (1920);
Oltman v. Williams, 167 N. C. 312, 83 S. E. 348 (1914).
" 199 N. C. 242, 153 S. E. 858 (1930) ; Note, 9 N. C. L. REv. 86 (1930) (real

estate broker represented house to be perfectly constructed and made of stone,
when in fact, it was stone veneer; held, representations made without knowledge
of their falsity, and consequently without intent to deceive). This case was cited
in the Brief for Appellees, pp. 4, 11, Atkinson v. Charlotte Builders, Inc., 232

N. C. 67, 59 S. E. 2d 1 (1950).
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of the Superior Court of Mecklenburg County. Included among the
papers was an instrument which in form appeared to be a holographic
will, dividing his property among the relatives of his deceased wife as
well as some of his own kin. The Clerk appointed a collector. No
probate in common form was had.
The heirs at law and next of kin brought an action to remove cloud
on title under N. C. GEN. STAT. §41-10 (1943) which prayed (1) that
the instrument be declared not to be the will of the deceased and (2)
ownership of the property of their kinsman free of any claim of the
defendants, who were the beneficiaries under the unprobated instrument.
The defendants contended the paper writing constituted a valid holographic will and should be probated as the last will of B. The issues
submitted by the trial court were as follows: (1) Was the said paper
writing found among the valuable papers and effects of the said B after
his death? (2) Is the said paper writing the last will and testament of
B? The trial judge instructed the jury to answer the first issue, No.
On appeal the defendant's demurrer ore tenus for want of jurisdiction
in the Superior Court, was sustained by the Supreme Court which held
that an attack on a will must originate by probate, which is exclusively
within the jurisdiction of the Clerk of the Superior Court, and that a
caveat is the proper proceeding to try the issue of devisavit vel non.1
The plaintiffs, believing they had a valid defense to the instrument,
faced a dilemma as to the procedure they should follow in order to
initiate an action to contest the validity of the will. The statutes provided a means whereby they could get the instrument into the hands of
the Clerk of the Superior Court but no means to compel anyone to
offer it for probate.2 Since there is no limitation on the period in which
a will may be offered for probate the heirs at law held a title of questionable value. 3
An unprobated will does not pass any title,4 and mere assertions of
an adverse claim standing alone are not sufficient to constitute a cloud.5
1 Brissie v. Craig, 232 N. C. 701, 62 S. E. 2d 330 (1950).
2
N. C. GEN. STAT. §31-5 (1943).
'Cooley v. Lee, 170 N. C. 18, 86 S. E. 720 (1915); Steadman v. Steadman,
143 N. C. 345, 55 S. E. 784 (1906); N. C. Gmr. STAT. §31-12 (1943) provides in part "... . Such will shall not be valid or effective to pass real estate or
personal property as against innocent purchasers for value and without notice,
unless it is probated or offered for probate within two years after the death of
the testator or devisor ...
." While this might protect subsequent purchasers
from the heirs at law it offers no protection to the heirs at law.
IN. C. GET. STAT. §31-39 (1943) : "No will shall be effectual to pass real or
personal estate unless it shall have been duly proved and allowed in the probate
court of the proper county... ." Paul v. Davenport, 217 N. C. 154, 7 S. E. 2d 352
(1940) ; Osborne v. Leak, 89 N. C. 433 (1883).
'Welles v. Rhodes, 59 Conn. 498, 22 AtI. 286 (1890) ; Israel v. Wolf, 100 Ga.
339, 28 S. E. 109 (1897) ; Trustees of Schools v. Wilson, 334 Ill. 347, 166 N. E.
55 (1929); Lovell v. Marshall, 162 Minn. 18, 202 N. W. 64 (1925); Sulphur
Mines Co. v. Boswell, 94 Va. 480, 27 S. E. 24 (1897).

1951]

NOTES AND COMMENTS

333

Cloud on title as it developed in equity is not broad enough to cover the
above situation." The action to remove cloud on title in North Carolina
is statutory 7 and has been given a liberal construction, thereby broadening
this equitable remedy.8 Accordingly a probated will can be construed in
this type of action, the question being what interest or title passes and
not the validity of the will.9 The aim of the principal case, as disclosed
by the prayer for judgment and the issues submitted, was to contest the
validity of the will and since this can only be done by a will contest the
plaintiff's action under this statute was improper.
Similar difficulties would have confronted the plaintiffs had they
tried to proceed under the declaratory judgment act. 10 Only the construction of a probated will could be tested in this type of proceeding.11
There could not be an attack on the validity of the will nor could the
construction of an unprobated will be obtained. 12 Also, the equitable
relief of injunction is not available to enjoin the probate of a will
where exclusive probate jurisdiction is conferred upon one court.13
By dictum the court pointed out the only relief available to the plain"Cloud on title is something which constitutes an apparent incumbrance upon
it or an apparent defect in it; something that shows prima facie some right of
a third party, either to the whole or some interest in it." Detroit v. Martin, 34
Mich. 170 (1876) ; McArthur v. Griffith, 147 N. C. 545, 61 S. E. 519 (1908).
IN. C. GEN. STAT. §41-10 (1943).
' "And it should and does extend to such adverse and wrongful claims, whether
in writing or parol, whenever a claim by parol, if established, could create an
interest or estate in the property .... And it should be allowed, too, when existent records or written instruments reasonably present such a claim. .. "
Satterwhite v. Gallagher, 173 N. C. 525, 528, 92 S.E. 369, 370 (1917) ; see also,
Platkin v. Merchants Bank, 188 N. C. 711, 125 S.E. 541 (1924) ; Southern State
Bank v. Summer, 187 N. C. 762, 122 S. E. 848 (1924); Carolina-Tennessee
Power Co. v. Hiawassee River Power Co., 175 N. C. 668, 96 S.E. 99 (1918).
'Lewis v. McConchie, 151 Kan. 778, 100 P. 2d 752 (1940); Hahn v. Verret,
143 Neb. 820, 11 N. W. 2d 551 (1943) ; Johnston v. Johnston, 218 N. C. 706, 12
S. E. 2d 248 (1940); Nobles v. Nobles, 177 N. C. 243, 98 S. E. 715 (1919);
Franklin v. Margay Oil Co., 194 Okla. 519, 153 P. 2d 486 (1944).
"0N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-253 to §1-267 (1943).
11 Smith v. Nelson, 249 Ala. 51, 29 So. 2d 335 (1949); Fillmore v. Yarborough, 246 Ala. 375, 20 So. 2d 792 (1945) ; Howard v. Bennett, 53 Cal. App.
2d 546, 127 P. 2d 1012 (1942); Colden v. Costello, 50 Cal. App. 2d 363, 122 P.
2d 959 (1942) ; Lloyd v. Weir, 116 Conn. 201, 164 Atl. 386 (1933) ; Sample v.
Ward, 156 Fla. 210, 23 So. 2d 81 (1945); Weppler v. Hoffine, 218 Ind. 31, 29
N. E. 2d 204 (1940); Sharpe v. Sharpe, 164 Kan. 484, 190 P. 2d 344 (1949);
Brown v. Trustees, 181 Md. 80, 28 A. 2d 582 (1942) ; Bank v. Morey, 320 Mass.
492, 70 N. E. 2d 316 (1946) ; Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Lambeth, 213 N. C.
576, 197 S.E. 179 (1938) ; Roundtree v. Roundtree, 213 N. C. 252, 195 S.E. 784
(1938); Anderson v. Anderson, 150 Ore. 476, 46 P. 2d 98 (1935); Chapin v.
Collard, 29 Wash. 2d 788, 189 P. 2d 642 (1948). For example of restrictions
on this
point see Note, 26 N. C. L. REv. 69 (1947).
2
Pennington v. Green, 152 Kan. 739, 107 P. 2d 766 (1941) ; Poore v. Poore,
201 N. C. 791, 161 S.E. 532 (1931); cf. Roundtree v. Roundtree, 213 N. C. 252,
195 S.E. 784 (1938).
" Furr v. Jordan, 196 Ga. 862, 27 S. E. 2d 861 (1943) ; Ragan v. Bank of
Rome, 177 Ga. 686, 170 S.E. 889 (1933) ; Israel v. Wolf, 100 Ga. 339, 28 S.E.
109 (1897) ; Feamster v. Feamster, 123 W. Va. 353, 15 S. E. 2d 159 (1941).
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tiffs. "He may invoke such remedy by the simple expedient of simultaneously applying to the Clerk of the Superior Court having jurisdiction

to have the script probated or proved, i.e., tested, and filing a caveat
asking that it be declared invalid as a testamentary instrument."'14 This
result is made possible by the construction placed upon the phrase "any
person interested in the estate" as found in the statute for probate; and
caveat to a will. 16 Since the heirs at law would take the property had
the owner died intestate, they are recognized as parties interested in the
estate.1 7 While this relationship might justify proceeding under either
one of the statutes, to permit the heirs at law to combine the above statutes and be both proponents and caveators produces an unusual situation.
Indeed one court said, "He is both proponent and defendant. His positions are incongruous. As a matter of procedure, he cannot be a party of
record on opposite sides of the same proposition."' 8 A proponent, however, is by definition a party who offers an instrument for legal adjudication. 19 It does not seem that this would require him to be interested in
having the validity sustained no matter how often such interests coincide.
This objection to caveat by a proponent is met also by the fact that a will
contest is a proceeding in rem and not between the parties. 20 The sole
issue is whether or not the instrument is a valid will. Accordingly most
of the courts which have passed upon this point have held that no
estoppel operates to prevent a proponent from caveating the will, and
especially is this true where the caveator was under a duty to produce
the will for probate.21
" Brissie v. Craig, 232 N. C. 701, 706, 62 S. E. 2d 330, 334 (1950).
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. §31-13 (1943) : "If no executor apply to have will proved
within sixty days after the death of the testator, any devisee or legatee named
in the will, or any other person interested in the estate, may make such
application. .

..

SN. C. GEN. STAT. §31-32 (1943) "...
any person entitled under such will,
or interested in the estate, may ... enter a caveat to the probate of such will ....
17 Hall v. Proctor, 242 Ala. 636, 7 So. 2d 764 (1942) ; In re Stoiber's
Estate,
101 Colo. 192, 72 P. 2d 276 (1937) ; In re Kinney's Estate, 233 Iowa 600, 10 N. W.
2d 73 (1943); Hemonas v. Orphan, 191 S. W. 2d 352 (Mo. 1946); In re Morrow's Will, 41 N. M. 723, 73 P. 2d 1360 (1937); Bailey v. McLain, 215 N. C.
150, 1 S. E. 2d 372 (1939); Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416, 72 N. E. 2d 245
(1947) ; In re Harjoche's Estate, 193 Okla. 631, 146 P. 2d 130 (1944).
18 Appeal of Thompson, In re Nichol's Estate, 114 Me. 338, 96 Atl. 238 (1915).
BLAcIc, LAW DicnioNARy (3rd Ed.) 1449.
"In re Cassada's Will, 228 N. C. 548, 46 S. E. 2d 468 (1948) ; In re Lomax'
Will, 226 N. C. 498, 39 S. E. 2d 388 (1946); Burney v. Holloway, 225 N. C.
633, 36 S. E. 2d 5 (1945); Bailey v. McClain, 215 N. C. 150, 1 S. E. 2d 372
(1939) ; In re Brown's Will, 194 N. C. 583, 140 S. E. 192 (1927) ; In re Young,
123 N. C. 358, 31 S. E. 626 (1898) ; Hutson v. Sawyer, 104 N. C. 1, 10 S. E. 85
(1889).
"1lit re Biehn's Estate, 41 Ariz. 403, 18 P. 2d 1112 (1933) ; Blatt v. Blatt, 79
Colo. 57, 243 Pac. 1099 (1926) ; Abercrombie v. Hair, 185 Ga. 728, 196 S. E. 447
(1938) ; Howard v. Howard, 268 Ky. 552, 105 S. W. 2d 630 (1937) ; Scott v. Dawson, 177 Okla. 213, 58 P. 2d 538 (1936); Letts v. Letts, 73 Okla. 313, 176 Pac.
234 (1918). As to statutory duty to produce will for probate see Blatt v. Blatt,
supra.
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The court's denial of the requested equitable relief because a remedy
existed at law is not objectionable in the principal case as a blind adherance to procedure which postpones adjudication on the merits.
Rather, it is a question of fundamental power to hear and determine
probate matters. The right to dispose of one's property by will is not
an inherent or guaranteed one, but rather one granted by the legislature. 22 Nor is is an unrestricted right. The Clerk of the Superior
Court is given exclusive original jurisdiction in probate .matters under
the statutes.23 The court had no alternative but to dismiss the action
and the suggested course of action, while unusual, represents no more
than a liberal interpretation of the statutes to meet an unanticipated
situation.
KENNETHa R. HOYLE.
Unincorporated Associations-Capacity to Sue and Be Sued
In a recent case' the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that
under N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-97(6) (1943)2 an unincorporated association
could sue or be sued in its common name. Although the statute in
question does not expressly authorize this departure from the common
" Wescott v. Bank, 227 N. C. 39, 40 S. E. 2d 461 (1946) ; Peace v. Edwards,
170 N. C. 64, 86 S. E. 807 (1915) ; Pullen v. Commissioners, 66 N. C. 361 (1872).
"' N. C. GEN. STAT. §2-16 (1943); N. C. GEN. STAT. §28-1 (1943); N. C.
GEN. STAT. §§31-12 to 31-27 (1943).
'Ionic Lodge No. 72 F.A. & A.M. v. Ionic Lodge Free Ancient & Accepted
Masons No. 72 Company, 232 N. C. 252, 59 S. E. 2d 829 (1950).
"Any unincorporated association or organization, whether resident or nonresident, desiring to do business in this state by performing any of the acts for
which it was formed, shall, before any such acts are performed, appoint an agent
in this state upon whom all processes and precepts may be served, and certify to
the clerk of the superior court of each county in which said association or organization desires to perform any of the acts for which it was organized the name
and address of such process agent. If said unincorporated association or organization shall fail to appoint the process agent pursuant to this subsection, all
precepts, and processes may be served upon the secretary of state of the state
of North Carolina. Upon such service, the secretary of state shall forward a
copy of the process or precept to the last known address of such unincorporated
association or organization. Service upon the process agent appointed pursuant
to this subsection or upon the secretary of state, if no process agent is appointed,
shall be legal and binding on said association or organization, and any judgment
recovered in any action commenced by service of process, as provided in this
subsection shall be valid and may be collected out of any real or personal property belonging to the association or organization.
"Any such unincorporated association or organization, now performing any of
the acts for which it was formed, shall within thirty days from the ratification of
this subsection, appoint an agent upon whom processes and precepts may be served,
as provided in this subsection, and in the absence of such appointment, such
processes and precepts may be served upon the secretary of state, as provided in
this subsection. Upon such service, the secretary of state shall forward a copy
of the process or precept to the last known address of such unincorporated association or organization."

